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In current discussions on African epistemology, the issue of justification of beliefs has mainly 
been considered from an externalist perspective, such that justification is described as 
achievable merely through the means of empirical verification and social context of 
discourse. However, this results in a knowledge-gap since both internalist and externalist 
perspectives are needed to arrive at a holistic notio  of epistemic justification. Consequently, 
the objective of this article is to fill this gap by employing the methods of conceptual and 
critical analysis to attempt an internalist interprtation of epistemic justification in the quest 
for a more balanced view of African epistemology. 
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Introduction 
There has been an extensive debate in contemporary epistemology on whether grounds for 
justifying beliefs are internal or external (Sosa 199 ; Kihyeon 1993; Marvan 2006). While 
internalists hold that what confers justification must be “within” the subject in that he or she 
must have a direct cognitive access to it, externalists posit that factors outside of the agent’s 
mind can affect the justificatory status of a belief. However, when the fabric of this debate is 
considered in relation to recent discussions on African epistemology, we begin to notice a 
one-sided discourse, because the grounds offered fo the justification of beliefs are deeply 
immersed in an externalist outlook. Thus this article should be seen as a preliminary attempt 
to fill this knowledge-gap by explicating the internalist framework of justification in African 
epistemology. 
More specifically, this article aims to highlight the relevance of the internalist-externalist 
debate in Western epistemology to the African epistmological perspective. It identifies the 
prevalent notion of justification in African epistemology as externalist; but it goes on to argue 
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that both the internalist and externalist frameworks of justification are needed in order to 
arrive at a comprehensive account of epistemic justification in African epistemology. 
The article is divided into four main sections. The next section argues for the necessity of an 
internalist orientation of justification in African epistemology. It is followed by a section 
which considers the rational grounds for traditional African beliefs in order to provide a 
rubric for the discourse on an internalist conception of epistemic justification in the 
traditional African context. Next, there is a section focusing on how metaphysical knowledge 
is acquired from a traditional African perspective that is essentially internalist. To further 
strengthen the central argument of the article, the fourth main section presents evidence for 
internalism in the epistemological perspectives of the Yoruba and Igbo cultures. 
 
The Necessity of Internalism in African Epistemology 
Internalism is the epistemological position which holds that factors that are relevant to the 
justification of knowledge-claims are within the epistemic agent. There are two senses in 
which internality is discussed by the internalist. The first connotes epistemic responsibility on 
the part of the epistemic agent to be aware of the reasonable grounds for any knowledge-
claim held. The “internal”, in this sense, is that to which one has introspective access: it 
includes beliefs, as well as visual and other sensory impressions. To have such access to 
something is to be aware of it or to be able, through self consciousness or at least by 
introspective reflection, to become aware of it (Audi 1989, 309). The second sense of 
internality has to do with a theory of justification which requires that all of the factors needed 
for a belief to be epistemically justified for a given person are cognitively accessible to that 
person, that is, within his or her cognitive perspectiv  (Bonjour 2010, 364). 
Although there are many different versions of interalism, almost all internalists agree that 
their general position is supported by a "responsibili t" conception of epistemic justification. 
Internalists hold that epistemically justified belief is epistemically responsible belief, but 
since epistemic responsibility is a function of considerations internal to the believing subject, 
epistemic justification is also a function of such internal considerations (Greco 1990, 245). 
This probably explains why Pollock (1999) maintains that internalism in epistemology is the 
view that the internal states of the cognizers is relevant in determining which of the 
cognizers’ beliefs are justified. 
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Following from the basic tenet of the internalist con eption of epistemic justification, I now 
wish to stress the need for an internalist framework of justification in African epistemology. 
To a large extent, African epistemology is connected with African metaphysics. This is 
hardly surprising, since epistemology deals with the nature and limits of human knowledge 
and therefore ideally includes metaphysical knowledge, especially when we talk about the 
conception of reality holistically rather than piecemeal. From the perspective of African 
culture, reality is not confined to the physical realm; rather, it comprises both the physical 
and the metaphysical, or the natural and the supernatural. For instance, the Yoruba conceive 
reality as that which fundamentally emanates from Olodumare - the arch divinity who is 
thought to exist eternally. It is from him that allthings that are enter into being, and it is he 
who determines the essence of a being. As Bolaji Idowu observes, within the Yoruba cultural 
parlance, “Olodumare is the origin and ground of all that is” (Idowu 1962, 17). It is a fact 
which impresses itself on the advocates of Yoruba culture, and Yoruba religion in particular. 
The interesting thing about this architecture of rational belief is that it is appropriated through 
introspection and reasoning, and those who share this cultural background come to accept 
such facts as reasonable grounds for belief in and reverence for Olodumare. 
Now, going by the dictates of the internalist theory f justification, all that is needed in order 
to justify a knowledge-claim is to determine whether the individual who claims to know, for 
instance, that “Olodumare is the ground of all being” has cognitive access to this belief, and 
whether or not the conditions that validate such a belief are located within the knowing 
subject. Alston (1989) lends credence to this submission in his assertion that what confers 
justification must be “internal” to the subject in that he or she must have a direct cognitive 
access to it: “It must consist of something like a belief or an experience, something that the 
subject can typically spot just by turning her attention to the matter” (Alston 1989, 5). Beliefs 
that are held in the manner outlined above are numerous in most African cultures, and they 
represent the internalist aspect of conceptions of kn wledge in African thought. 
Those who are sympathetic to the externalist orientation of justification might be opposed to 
the position being advanced in this article. Within the discourse on African epistemology, the 
externalist notion of justification has been advanced by Udefi (2009), Jimoh (1999), 
Aigbodioh (1997) and Njoku (2000), among others. Such scholars can be seen as taking the 
metaphysical approach to knowledge in African thought for granted. The predominant 
conclusion of the externalist interpretation of justification in African epistemology is that the 
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phenomenon of human knowledge in African thought can be explained either from the 
contextualist or neo-positivist standpoints. The contextualist notion of justification holds that 
we should see our knowledge claims as situated within social milieu, so that we should not 
think of knowledge, truth and rational certainty in abstract terms (Jimoh 1999, 37). On its 
part, the neo-positivist notion of justification in African epistemology claims that knowledge 
is essentially dependent on empirical factors such as sense-experience or sensory perception 
(Hallen and Sodipo 1986). Both epistemic positions are immersed in the externalist 
orientation of justification. The problem with this orientation is that it does not account for 
those aspects of the African worldview expressed in oral traditions and existential relations, 
and, as such, does not give a full picture of how Africans apprehend reality in general. 
Yet the life experiences of African people are multi-dimensional, revealing the nature of 
reality to African people in ways that are subject to plural interpretations. In this process of 
interpretation, references are often made to realiti s that transcend the physical, and the 
senses alone cannot fully apprehend the nature of such realities. Nevertheless, the need to 
apprehend these realities lies at the very heart of the African worldview, and yet this aspect of 
the African worldview cannot be captured by the externalist mode of explanation. 
Furthermore, African metaphysical beliefs are rooted in an understanding appropriated from 
everyday experience of the universe; and its articulation is made possible through a process 
of rational belief-formation and introspective awareness consistent with the internalist 
perspective of knowledge acquisition. At the base of the internalist notion of justification is 
the assumption that knowledge is an individual thing because it starts with the self in terms of 
rational cognition. It is this rationalist aspect of African thought that we aim to underscore 
through this internalist interpretation of justification in African epistemology. 
 
The Rational Basis of Traditional African Beliefs  
By “rational basis of beliefs”, we refer to those are s of thought that are shrouded in a 
metaphysical and non-material understanding of reality such that the grounds offered as 
justification of such beliefs are more internal than external. A basic concern of epistemology 
is to determine the conditions that render beliefs justified. Since justification has to do with 
the requirement that we give adequate reasons for the beliefs that we hold, this section seeks 
to illustrate the consistency of the rational basis of traditional African beliefs with the 
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internalist notion of justification. The internalist notion of justification asserts that a belief 
can be accorded the status of knowledge if the epistem c agent holding it has some form of 
awareness of the rational grounds for regarding it to be true. 
Rational thinking is present in the epistemic categories of the African people. There is no 
doubt that a great number of beliefs and practices ar  to be found in any African society 
(Mbiti 1969, 3). However, our epistemic exploration here does not in any way suggest that all 
of the beliefs held within any African cultural framework are rationally constructed: there are 
other beliefs that are not developed through pure rational inquest or introspection. Sometimes 
a belief is formulated to explain observable natural p ocesses, as in the instance of the belief 
that having a good rainy season results in a bountiful harvest. 
Our exposition of the rational basis of African beliefs is informed by the internalist 
perspective which requires that a person have some f rm of cognitive grasp of whatever 
makes his or her belief justified. The sense of “inter al” here entails the use of the mind to 
comprehend reality independent of the empirical windows (five senses) through which 
knowledge about the physical world is derived. Indeed, within the purview of African culture, 
knowledge is not only a product of external or empirical conditions of justification, but also a 
matter of the agent’s perspective. 
Our interest in the exploration of the fabric of the African belief-system is to show, contrary 
to what the advocates of the externalist account of justification in African epistemology 
would have us believe, that beliefs can pass as knowledge in so far as the epistemic agent has 
some rational grounds for thinking that the beliefs are true. With reference to traditional 
African thought, many beliefs are regarded, on rational grounds, as not only true, but also as 
constituting indubitable grounds for knowledge. A good example of this is belief in the 
existence of gods and other spirit beings in African religion. The spiritual world plays a 
crucial role in African life for the reason that not every aspect of reality can be interpreted in 
purely physical terms. According to Mbiti (1969, 75), the spirits in general belong to the 
mode of existence between God and humans. Mbiti’s assertion presupposes the dynamic 
nature of the African belief in the metaphysical reality of the spiritual world. In this regard, 
he further observes: 
The spiritual world of African peoples is very densly populated with spiritual 
beings and the living-dead. Their insight of spiritual realities, whether absolute 
or apparent, is extremely sharp. To understand their rel gious ethos and 
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philosophical perception it is essential to consider their concepts of the 
spiritual world in relation to the concepts of God. We have repeatedly 
emphasized that the spiritual universe is a unit with the physical, and that these 
two intermingle and dovetail into each other so much that it is not easy, or 
even necessary, at times to draw the distinction (Mbiti 1969, 75). 
Thus belief in the spirit world is exceedingly strong in traditional Africa, and carries with it a 
profound conviction regarding the existence of a metaphysical realm. 
However, the African belief in spirits and other metaphysical beings is not based on neo-
positivist evidence, but rather on rational evidence. For instance, the African belief in the 
reality of the gods probably stems from the manifest initude of the human person, as well as 
from certain overwhelming circumstances in the universe that are not caused by humans. 
That Africans hold such a belief as an item of knowledge indicates that not all knowledge-
claims within African culture need to be validated by external means. 
The Significance of African Metaphysical beliefs  
In a bid to highlight the internalist aspects of epistemological conceptions in African thought, 
we now delve into the fabric of African metaphysics. We have adopted this approach because 
there can be no adequate appreciation of epistemic justification in African thought without 
bearing in mind that Africans conceive reality holistically. When we are talking about the 
notion of reality, we are implicitly referring to the notion of being - what is. Yet in 
considering the question of what there is, one alsoneeds to address the question of how one 
knows what there is. This suggests that there is a connection between metaphysics and 
epistemology - a link that is evident in African thought. 
In a general sense, metaphysics investigates reality in a bid to uncover the most fundamental 
contents of being as being. This explains why it ismostly considered as a kind of systematic 
study of being or reality as it is rather than as it appears. Aristotle describes it as the study of 
“being qua being” or an attempt to understand the transcendental nature of being as it is 
(Aristotle 1956, Book E 1065a26). Accordingly, a people’s worldview should include their 
holistic conception of ultimate reality rather than  mitigated conception of being. The thrust 
of the discourse on African metaphysics is the African religious outlook. In fact, it would be 
difficult to separate African religion from African metaphysics. As Mbiti (1969, 7) correctly 
observes, from the perspective of Africans, the whole of reality, which is the sphere of 
metaphysics, is coloured by religion: from the beginning of a person’s life to its end and even 
beyond death, Africans have religious interpretations for each situation. Hence, ontology to 
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the Africans is a religious ontology: it is an ontology that has its foundations in the idea of 
“life-force”, or “vital force”. In fact, for Placide Tempels, force in African thought is 
inextricably bound up with being, that is, Africans do not separate being from force as its 
attribute; rather, they speak, act, live, as if for them being is force - force for them is the 
nature of being, force is being, being is force (Temp ls 1959, 21). 
Another significant feature of this metaphysical belief is that it offers a way of accounting for 
the non-material aspects of knowledge. However, we are not interested in an elaborate 
exposition of African metaphysics here; rather, we se k to examine how metaphysical beliefs 
are formed and the reasons offered for their justifica ion, which in a way goes to show that 
Africans are capable of rational thinking in their knowledge-formation. The point being made 
here is that most African metaphysical beliefs are based on the types of evidence that can be 
referred to as “internalist”, such that the knower has some rationally defendable convictions 
about the beliefs. This view is further strengthened by Conee and Feldman (1985, 25) in their 
discussion of epistemic justification, where they  anticipate the internalist claim that a belief 
is justified only where the person has cognitive access to the evidence that supports the truth 
of the belief. This implies that all that is needed for the justification of African metaphysical 
beliefs is for the epistemic agents that claim to possess knowledge to be sure that they believe 
in certain entities, such as extra-terrestrial beings. 
Furthermore, Innocent Onyewuenyi, in his writings on African epistemology, traces the 
foundation of knowledge to a divine realm, which presupposes the idea of rational cognition: 
A person is said to know or have wisdom inasmuch as e approaches divine 
wisdom. One approaches divine knowledge when one’s fl sh becomes less 
fleshy, to use Leopold Senghor’s expression, that is, he older a person gets, 
the more wisdom he has. The same note of hierarchy comes into play here. 
The ancestors have more wisdom, followed by the eldrs, dead or living. 
Distinction must be made here of the two levels of human intelligence. 
Intelligence can be either practical or habitual. Practical intelligence is 
cleverness, slyness in dealing with the contingent aspects of forces. Habitual 
intelligence is active knowledge of the nature of forces, their relationship. And 
this includes how man, the being with intelligence, makes use of things and 
activates the forces asleep in them. This kind of wisdom is different from book 
knowledge, which is not regarded as wisdom in the strict traditional sense 
(Onyewuenyi 1976, 525). 
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Onyewuenyi underscores an important point which should be given more consideration, 
namely, the fact that one’s ancestors are regarded as possessing wisdom. No matter how 
uncritical this statement appears to be, it does not repudiate the fact that this kind of belief is 
held in African culture. In so far as there are reasonable grounds offered for their cognition 
and articulation, the internalist requires us to pay attention to those rational grounds. One of 
the rational grounds that can be offered for the ascription of wisdom to dead relatives is the 
belief that those who died at old age would have accumulated much wisdom over many 
years, and that such wisdom ought to be shared with the living for the purpose of guidance. 
The African metaphysical understanding, especially ts emphasis on the concept of being, is 
deeply rooted in a system of a priori epistemological conceptions. This is corroborated by 
Okoro’s description of the African metaphysical system as one which regards spirit, force, 
life-force, or vital-force as the primordial principle which permeates all things and is 
responsible for unity in diversity (Okoro 2011, 4). The African worldview also includes 
belief in the living-dead, ancestors and spirits (Ogungbemi 1997, 45). All of these 
metaphysical beliefs are rationally constructed in line with Wedgwood’s conception of the 
rationality of a belief as something which purely relies on “internal facts” about the thinker's 
mental state (Wedgwood 2002, 349). 
 
Internalism in Yoruba and Igbo Thought 
In this section, we examine the epistemological pers ctives of Yoruba and Igbo thought 
systems in order to correctly situate our discourse on the internalist conception of justification 
in African epistemology. 
Internalism From the Yoruba Epistemological Perspective 
According to Hallen and Sodipo (1986, 60), for the Yoruba, knowledge is derived from 
firsthand experience of the physical world through the sense of sight. However, this position 
is a faulty one since it does not consider the facttha  the Yoruba conceive of reality as 
including that which transcends the physical world. There are many beliefs that the Yoruba 
hold that are not derived from firsthand sense-experience, and that are nonetheless regarded 
as knowledge. A good example of these is the Yoruba belief that one’s success or failure in 
life has a lot to do with one’s destiny which is deriv d from Olodumare (God in Yoruba 
belief). Indeed, they believe that a person’s course of life has been predestined by 
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Olodumare. To the Yoruba, the end for which a person is created is inextricably bound up 
with his or her destiny (Idowu 1962, 179). 
Another piece of evidence for an internalist perspectiv  of epistemic justification within the 
Yoruba cultural purview is the belief in the after-life: the rational explanation the Yoruba 
offer as the condition for an individual to live after death is moral uprightness: 
Death is not the end of life. It is only a means whereby the present earthly 
existence is changed for another. After death, therefore, man passes, into a 
‘life beyond’ which is called Ehin-Iwa - ‘After-Life. This Ehin-Iwa is of vital 
importance than the present life, however prosperous this one may have been. 
The Yoruba thus speak of Ehin-Iwa ti I segbon Oni – ‘After-Life’ which is the 
superior of Today (the present). Whatever is done in the present life, therefore 
must be done with due regard to this great future: Nitori Ehin Iwa l’a se n se 
oni l’ oore - ‘It is on account of After-Life that we treat Today hospitably (that 
we make a good use of the present and do not abuse it). In After-Life, those 
who have finished here go on living (Idowu 1962, 204).  
 
The Yoruba strongly hold these beliefs, and yet they ar  not based on any positivist criterion 
for justification. The reasons behind these beliefs often have a religious orientation, and the 
people seldom question their veracity, mainly because such beliefs are connected to their 
cultural roots. The basis for regarding such beliefs as knowledge is consistent with the 
internalist criterion for justification, namely, that an epistemic agent should have some 
reasonable grounds for regarding his or her beliefs as true and as thereby constituting 
knowledge, and that such items of knowledge (gained through intuition or reflection) should 
be cognitively available to the knower. It would be pointless to try to convince the Yoruba to 
accept the position of Hallen and Sodipo that such beliefs are not knowledge because they 
lack the status of firsthand empirical verification. Thus for the Yoruba, knowledge cannot be 
limited to the physical world - it transcends the physical world to include the comprehension 
of metaphysical reality. This view is aptly supported by Washington (2010, 6) in his 
observation that “in traditional African world-view one’s vision is not necessarily limited to 
the range of one’s physical eyesight. Human beings can be endowed with spiritual vision. 
What the Yoruba refer to as ori-inu (inner eyes) and what others call the third eye is the 
source of spiritual vision”. 
Yet another piece of evidence for internalism from the Yoruba epistemological perspective is 
the postulation of eri-okan (the witness of the perceiver’s okon, that is, his heart, mind or 
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apprehension), which Hallen and Sodipo incorrectly interpreted as the validating criterion of 
empirically derived knowledge. According to the epistemological analysis provided by 
Hallen and Sodipo (1986), eri-okan is that which validates the empirical beliefs deriv d from 
the external world. Thus if one claims to see that what is in the room is a chair rather than a 
cupboard, it is one’s eri-okan or witnessing of the mind that would support one’s claim that 
what one sees is a chair and not something else. This is why Hallen and Sodipo (1986, 61) 
describe eri-okan as “your mind witnessing something ‘for’ or ‘to’ you”, indicating self 
consciousness; But it also indicates comprehension and judgement (Hallen and Sodipo 1986, 
61). It is important to note that eri-okan is an internalist criterion for the justification of
knowledge, even though Hallen and Sodipo (1986) failed to see it as such. It indicates 
cognitive validation of a belief derived from empirical perception. For instance, if one 
believes that what one sees is a table rather than a tree, it is at the cognitive level that one can 
distinguish between conflicting perceptual experiences. Eri-okan is an affirmation of the fact 
that the epistemic agent has cognitive access to the beliefs that form the basis of his or her 
knowledge. Consequently, the ri-okan is evidence of internalism in the Yoruba 
epistemological framework. 
Internalism from the Igbo Epistemological Perspective 
The Igbo cultural perspective holds that knowledge is restricted neither to empirically 
verifiable claims, nor to contextualist notions of justification. The Igbo epistemological 
conception also transcends the physical order of things by including the metaphysical 
dimension. The term omenala, that is, “inherited patterns of thought” (Edeh 1985, 59), 
depicts the Igbo conceptualization of life (Ojike 1955, 150). Nwala (1985) provides us with a 
clear description of how this term functions in Igbo thought: 
omenala, …, refers to what accords to the basic beliefs and mores without 
which, in fact, as the igbo expresses it, the community would cease to exist 
because it must have lost touch with reality and the source of their existence. It 
does refer to the ideological expression of their economic, social, religious and 
political practice. It is that which also regulates their social practice (Nwala 
1985, 27). 
Thus Omenala includes major Igbo beliefs about the origin and nature of the universe, the 
place of the spirits, deities, humans and other beings in it, as well as the nature of 
prescriptions and prohibitions in such a universe. Thus it is evident that for the Igbo, reality is 
not limited to the physical world, and the validation of knowledge can therefore not be 
limited to external means. 
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Furthermore, from the Igbo epistemological perspectiv , it is possible for one to derive 
knowledge from the information provided by other pesons, even if one does not empirically 
see the phenomenon in question for oneself. What is important is that the source of the 
information is trustworthy. This kind of knowledge is what is referred to as amamife - the 
totality of all that a person knows. Knowing therefor  is regarded as the ability to recognize 
what a person has encountered before, and involves the interaction of a person with his or her 
environment. Thus amamife is a representation or account of the facts in the world for which 
we have good reasons to accept as true, and that we re able to explain to other people (Udefi 
1999, 151). The representation referred to here is cognitive information which is 
communicated to other epistemic agents within the social whole. 
In addition, the Igbo hold that apart from knowledg derived from interaction with the 
environment, there is also the metaphysical dimension of knowledge, expressed in the 
doctrine of the after-life and the existence of spirit beings. This, in a way, explains why Igbo 
philosophy is coloured by its ontology which emphasize  belief in the spiritual nature of 
things, and a type of cosmic harmony in which humans d their actions are central, with 
supernatural powers superintending. 
African thought, Igbo thought included, holds that created beings preserve an intimate 
ontological relationship with one another (Onyewuenyi 1979, 524). This ontological 
relationship is made possible by a rational understanding of the world of spirit beings. These 
spirit beings are believed to feature prominently in the lives of individuals and of the society 
at large. Indeed, it requires a level of reflection and a capacity for abstraction to conceive of a 
metaphysical system such as the one held by the Igbo. What this implies is that from the Igbo 
cultural perspective, there is room for non-physical re lities that are conceived through the 
use of reason. That this kind of abstract thinking is communicated between people who share 
this cultural understanding is evidence of some levl of cognitive awareness by the epistemic 
agents involved. Thus the Igbo metaphysical system points to an internalist perspective of 
epistemic justification. 
By the same token, it is important to emphasise that t e two conditions of knowledge put 
forward by advocates of an externalist orientation of justification in African epistemology, 
namely, direct sense perception and testimony, do not exhaust the sources of knowledge in 
traditional Igbo thought. The Igbo also give credence to inductive reasoning, which is often 
ignored in the treatment of African thought. Undoubtedly, perception or what is empirically 
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observable constitutes one of the means of verifying k owledge among the Igbo, but this is 
not all that there is to the validation of knowledg in this community. For the Igbo, what is 
experienced is known in a firsthand manner. Thus they may say “nkaa bu ewu ojii (this is a 
black goat).” They may regard such knowledge as reliabl  but not infallible, because they 
know that our senses do not guarantee absolute certainty of what we claim to know (Udefi 
1999, 157). Thus for the Igbo, beliefs acquired or de ived from the senses constitute a 
necessary but not sufficient source of knowledge, because the human mind (apka uche) has 
an even greater role to play in knowledge validation. 
The point here is that the human mind is not merely a passive receptacle of knowledge, but an 
active participant in the acquisition of knowledge. The situation here is simple: what one 
perceives (through the senses) is later processed and perhaps retained by the mind, thereby 
making it possible for the person to recollect what w s previously presented to him or her, 
and this seems to guarantee the continued existence of physical objects even when they are 
not being perceived. This seems to be the case whenthe Igbo say “ka mu chete ife’m huru 
(Let me remember or recollect what I saw)” (Udefi 1999, 158). The mental aspect of 
knowledge acquisition emphasised here is quite instructive, as it substantiates, to an extent, 
the internalist notion of epistemic justification which holds that the mental state of the 
epistemic agent is crucial to the task of epistemic justification. 
Apart from the Yoruba and Igbo cultural perspectives examined in this section, there are 
numerous African cultures that hold strong beliefs about metaphysical realities such as the 
after-life, spirits, and the divinities and God’s asociates. Belief in the spirits of the dead 
forms a crucial part of the rubric of the African worldview. Crispinous Iteyo, who has 
attempted a philosophical interpretation of beliefs in the spirits of the dead in Africa with a 
view to identifying rational grounds for accepting them, writes: 
There is the conception of the world of spirits. The categories of spiritual 
beings in this world differ from one thought system to the other. Nevertheless, 
it is apparent that there is the category of God or the Supreme Being, and then 
the category of “other spirits”, that is, ancestral spirits and/or “the spirits of the 
dead”. Spirits are believed to have more power than umans, but have less 
power than God. Some may be seen as having places of abode, while others 
seem to wander the wilderness. Because they have mor  power than humans, 
they are capable of diminishing or increasing human power. To avoid the 
diminishing and to enhance the increment of power, humans placate them 
through prayer or other practices such as naming the newborn after departed 
relatives, or burying the dead with pomp and funfair (Iteyo 2009, 157).  




We have sought to highlight the fact that it is inappropriate for a discourse on what 
constitutes knowledge within African culture to exclude a discussion of the rational aspects 
of belief-formation and belief-acquisition. Towards this end, we have endeavoured to 
illustrate that along with the externalist approach to epistemic justification, traditional African 
thought recognises other means of validating knowledge, chiefly the internalist perspective. 
Drawing insights from some ethno-linguistic units in Africa, we have tried to show that 
Africans are capable of arriving at knowledge through non-empirical means, especially 
knowledge by means of reflection - knowledge one achieves merely by thinking about a 
given phenomenon or any particular matter at hand. Reflection is often aimed at 
understanding the world and humankind’s place in it, which often leads to the construction of 
belief systems that account for the human person’s relationship with the trans-physical world, 
spiritual beings, and other supernatural realities. A  Bakari (1997, 2) observes, African 
epistemology involves a view of the world through a spiritual lens. 
As is evident from our examination of the Yoruba and Igbo epistemological perspectives, 
beliefs are a very important feature of African culture, greatly influencing human behaviour. 
They are handed down from one generation to the othr, sometimes with modifications. As 
such, to dismiss beliefs as a human category of thoug t that cannot qualify as knowledge is 
quite inappropriate. This is the major reason why te attempt to restrict the concept of 
knowledge to empirical data as is done by advocates of neo-positivism and by supporters of 
contextualist notions of justification in African epistemology should be re-examined. As the 
foregoing reflections have illustrated, there are numerous beliefs and epistemological 
predispositions in indigenous African culture that are more compatible with the internalist 
notion of epistemic justification than with the extrnalist one. This internalist interpretation of 
knowledge justification has been the missing link i the present discourse on African 
epistemology which this article has attempted to address. 
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